| 393 | 1 | 713 |
| 下载次数 | 被引频次 | 阅读次数 |
温室效应已成为全球经济和环境可持续发展的重要挑战,而能源行业结构转型则是实现绿色低碳发展目标的必然选择。在多主体协同驱动机制下基于“政府—新能源行业—传统能源行业”三方主体,建立随机演化博弈模型,引入It??随机微分方程理论,对各博弈方行为策略的稳定性条件进行分析,并借助数值仿真探讨关键因素对策略演化路径及收敛速度的作用机制。研究表明,新能源行业对随机扰动较为敏感,传统能源行业次之,政府受到的影响较小;政府在能源行业结构转型中发挥着不可替代的引导作用,但过度依赖政府支持不利于能源行业的可持续发展;合作收益与成本的动态变化通过行业异质性引致策略分化,新能源行业对收益成本的变动高度敏感,而传统能源行业则主要表现为演化速度的变化。基于此,从政策引导、行业互动及市场机制等多方面为推进能源行业结构转型提供理论参考。
Abstract:The greenhouse effect has become an important challenge for the sustainable development of the global economy and environment,and the structural transformation of the energy industry is an inevitable choice to achieve the goal of green and low-carbon development. Under the multi-agent collaborative driving mechanism,a stochastic evolutionary game model is established based on the tripartite subject of "government-new energy industry-traditional energy industry". The It?? stochastic differential equation theory is introduced to analyze the stability conditions of the behavior strategies of each game party,and the mechanism of key factors on the evolution path and convergence speed of the strategy is discussed by means of numerical simulation. The research shows that the new energy industry is the most sensitive to random disturbance,followed by the traditional energy industry and the government. The government plays an irreplaceable guiding role in the structural transformation of the energy industry,but over-reliance on government support is not conducive to the sustainable development of the energy industry,the dynamic changes of cooperation benefits and costs lead to strategic differentiation through industry heterogeneity.The new energy industry is highly sensitive to the changes in benefits and costs,while the traditional energy industry is mainly characterized by changes in evolution speed. Based on this,it provides a theoretical reference for promoting the structural transformation of the energy industry from the aspects of policy guidance,industry interaction and market mechanism.
[1]Shahbaz M,Wang J,Dong K,et al.The impact of digital economy on energy transition across the globe:The mediating role of government governance[J].Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews,2022,166:112620.
[2]Song W F,Han X F.Does the digital economy contribute to China's energy transition?[J].Economic Change and Restructuring,2024,57(5):1-25.
[3]Wang Q,Wang X,Li R.Geopolitical risks and energy transition:The impact of environmental regulation and green innovation[J].Humanities and Social Sciences Communications,2024,11:1272.
[4]Yang G L,Zhang G X,Cao D Q,et al.China's provincial-level sustainable energy transition requires accelerating renewable energy technological innovation[J].Energy,2024,288:129672.
[5]赵德福,袁家海,张健,等.多层次视角下颠覆性技术驱动的中国能源电力转型路径[J].电力建设,2024,45(8):1-10.
[6]刘平阔,卢存禹.中国能源转型路径选择的影响因素:理论检验与实证分析[J].中国软科学,2022(6):51-61.
[7]Liu F,Wei Y H,Du Y,et al.Mechanism and influencing factors of low-carbon coal power transition under China's carbon trading scheme:An evolutionary game analysis[J]. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health,2022,20(1):463.
[8]柴瑞瑞,李纲.可再生清洁能源与传统能源清洁利用:发电企业能源结构转型的演化博弈模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2022,42(1):184-197.
[9]牛文涛,董安洞,陈晓.基于演化博弈的中国乡村能源转型多主体协同机制研究[J].管理现代化,2024,44(6):1-16.
[10]崔宁,周宇,赵晓亮.四方主体参与碳减排的演化博弈研究[J].中国环境科学,2023,43(12):6788-6802.
[11]孙华丽,王循庆,薛耀锋.基于不同情景的群体性突发事件随机演化博弈模型[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(4):23-30.
[12]徐松鹤,胡少龙,韩传峰.基于改进复制动态方程的邻避事件随机演化博弈模型[J].数学的实践与认识,2021,51(15):1-12.
[13]董昌其,刘纪达,米加宁.安全生产数字化协同监管集体行动的随机演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2023,32(11):155-162.
[14]李军强,任浩,甄杰.基于随机演化博弈的企业研发操纵多重监管路径研究[J].中国管理科学,2021,29(10):191-201.
[15]Kloeden P E, Platen E. Numerical solution of stochastic differential equations[M].Berlin:Springer,1992.
[16]Platen E,Wagner W.On a taylor formula for a class of It??processes[J].Probability and Mathematical Statistics,1982,3(1):37-51.
[17]斯特曼,朱岩.商务动态分析方法:对复杂世界的系统思考与建模[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2007.
[18]徐昕怡,董雨.能源行业结构转型三方演化博弈分析[J].安徽工业大学学报(自然科学版),2021,38(4):449-459.
[19]Zhu Q Y,Zhang X,Pan Y H,et al.Optimizing environmental regulation policies for digital transformation in energy enterprises in China:An evolutionary game theory approach[J].Journal of Environmental Management,2024,370:122935.
[20]Cheng L F,Pan P,Lu W T,et al.The evolutionary game equilibrium theory on power market bidding involving renewable energy companies[J].International Journal of Electrical Power&Energy Systems,2025,167:110588.
基本信息:
中图分类号:F426.2
引用信息:
[1]李艳梅,彭寒.随机演化博弈视角下能源行业结构转型分析[J].技术经济与管理研究,2026,No.355(02):10-18.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金地区科学项目“电力需求侧信息的精准推荐及隐私风险控制研究”(72164026)、“电力需求侧信息质量的测量体系与改进方法研究”(71964022)
2026-02-25
2026-02-25